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Around the globe, the state is in the spot-
light. Far-reaching developments in the global eco-
nomy have us revisiting basic questions about gov-
ernment: what its role should be, what it can and
cannot do, and how best to do it.
The last fifty years have shown clearly both the
benefits and the limitations of state action, espe-
cially in the promotion of development.
Governments have helped to deliver substantial
improvements in education and health and reduc-
tions in social inequality But government actions
have also led to some very poor outcomes. And
even where governments have done a good job in
the past, many worry that they will not be able to
adapt to the demands of a globalizing world
economy
The new worries and questions about the state's
role are many and various, but four recent devel-
opments have given them particular impetus:
The collapse of command-and-control
economies in the former Soviet Union and
Central and Eastern Europe
The fiscal crisis of the welfare state in most of
the established industrial countries
The important role of the state in the "miracle"
economies of East Asia
The collapse of states and the explosion in
humanitarian emergencies in several parts of the
world.
This Report shows that the determining factor
behind these contrasting developments is the effec-
tiveness of the state. An effective state is vital for the
provision of the goods and servicesand the rules
and institutionsthat allow markets to flourish
and people to lead healthier, happier lives. Without
it, sustainable development, both economic and
social, is impossible. Many said much the same
thing fifty years ago, but then they tended to mean
that development had to be state-provided. The
message of experience since then is rather different:
that the state is central to economic and social
development, not as a direct provider of growth
but as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator.
What makes for an effective state differs enor-
mously across countries at different stages of devel-
opment. What works in the Netherlands or New
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Zealand, say, may not work in Nepal. Even among
countries at the same level of income, differences in
size, ethnic makeup, culture, and political systems
make every state unique. But this very diversity
enriches this ReporG inquiry into why and how
some states do better than others at sustaining
development, eradicating poverty, and responding
to change.
Rethinking the Statethe World
Over
The world is changing, and with it our ideas about
the state's role in economic and social development.
Today intense focus on the stat&s role is reminis-
cent of an earlier era, when the world was emerging
from the ravages of World War II, and much of the
developing world was just gaining its indepen-
dence. Then development seemed a more easily
surmountableand largely technicalchallenge.
Good advisers and technical experts would formu-
late good policies, which good governments would
then implement for the good of society State-led
intervention emphasized market failures and
accorded the state a central role in correcting them.
But the institutional assumptions implicit in this
world view were, as we all realize today, too sim-
plistic. Flexibility to implement the policies devised
by technocrats was accorded pride of place.
Accountability through checks and balances was
regarded as an encumbrance.
In a few countries things have indeed worked out
more or less as the technocrats expected. But in
many countries outcomes were very different.
Governments embarked on fanciful schemes.
Private investors, lacking confidence in public poli-
cies or in the steadfastness of leaders, held back.
Powerful rulers acted arbitrarily Corruption
became endemic. Development faltered, and
poverty endured.
Over the last century the size and scope of govern-
ment have expanded enormously, particularly in
the industrial countries (Figure 1). The pre-World
War II expansion was driven by, among other fac-
tors, the need to address the heavy toll on economic
and social systems brought on by the Great
Depression. The postwar confidence in government
bred demands for it to do more. Industrial eco-
nomies expanded the welfare state, and much of the
15
developing world embraced state-dominated
development strategies. The result was a tremen-
dous expansion in the size and reach of government
worldwide. State spending now constitutes almost
half of total income in the established industrial
countries, and around a quarter in developing
countries. But this very increase in the state's influ-
ence has also shifted the emphasis from the quanti-
tative to the qualitative, from the sheer size of the
state and the scope of its interventions to its
effectiveness in meeting people's needs.
Figure 1 The state has grown everywhere
Total government expenditure
(percentage of GDP)
OECD countries
Central government expenditure
(percentage of GOP)
Developing countries
Note: Data for the OECD countries are for central and local
government, including social security expenditures. See the Technical
Note for details. Source: Tanzi and Schuknecht 1995; OECD, various
years; IMF, various years (b).
50
40
30
20
10
0
As in the 1940s, today renewed focus on the state's
role has been inspired by dramatic events in the
global economy, which have fundamentally
changed the environment in which states operate.
The global integration of economies and the spread
of democracy have narrowed the scope for arbitrary
and capricious behavior. Taxes, investment rules,
and economic policies must be ever more respon-
sive to the parameters of a globalized world econ-
omy Technological change has opened new
opportunities for unbundling services and allowing
a larger role for markets. These changes have meant
new and different roles for governmentno longer
as sole provider but as facilitator and regulator.
States have come under pressure even where gov-
ernments have previously seemed to perform well.
Many industrial countries find themselves grap-
pling with a welfare state that has grown unwieldy
and having to make difficult choices about the ser-
vices and benefits that people should expect gov-
ernment to provide. Marketsdomestic and
globaland citizens vexed by state weaknesses
have come to insist, often through grassroots and
other nongovernmental organizations, on trans-
parency in the conduct of government, and on
other changes to strengthen the ability of the state
to meet its assigned objectives.
The clamor for greater government effectiveness has
reached crisis proportions in many developing
countries where the state has failed to deliver even
such fundamental public goods as property rights,
roads, and basic health and education. There a
vicious circle has taken hold: people and businesses
respond to deteriorating public services by avoiding
taxation, which leads to further deterioration in ser-
vices. In the former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe it was the state's long-term failure to
deliver on its promises that led, finally to its over-
throw. But the collapse of central planning has cre-
ated problems of its own. In the resulting vacuum,
citizens are sometimes deprived of basic public
goods such as law and order. At the limit, as in
Afghanistan, Liberia, and Somalia, the state has
sometimes crumbled entirely leaving individuals
and international agencies trying desperately to
pick up the pieces.
A Two-Part Strategy
How can we cut through the maze of questions and
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pressures now facing the world states? No one-
size-fits-all recipe for an effective state is suggested
here. The range of differences among states is too
enormous as are their starting points. Rather this
Report provides a broad framework for addressing
the issue of the state's effectiveness worldwide. It
points to a number of ways to narrow the growing
gap between the demands on states and their capa-
bility to meet those demands. Getting societies to
accept a redefinition of the state's responsibilities
will be one part of the solution. This will include
strategic selection of the collective actions that
states will try to promote, coupled with greater
efforts to take the burden off the state, by involving
citizens and communities in the delivery of core
collective goods.
But reducing or diluting the stat&s role cannot be
the end of the reform story Even with more selec-
tivity and greater reliance on the citizenry and on
private firms, meeting a broad range of collective
needs more effectively will still mean making the
state's central institutions work better. For human
welfare to be advanced, the state's capability-
defined as the ability to undertake and promote
collective actions efficientlymust be increased.
This basic message translates into a two-part strat-
egy to make every state a more credible, effective
partner in its country's development:
Matching the state's role to its capability is the
first element in this strategy. Where state capa-
bility is weak, how the state intervenesand
whereshould be carefully assessed. Many
states try to do too much with few resources and
little capability and bften do more harm than
good. A sharper focus on the fundamentals
would improve effectiveness (Box 1). But here it
is a matter not just of choosing what to do and
what not to dobut of how to do it as well.
But capability is not destiny Therefore the sec-
ond element of the strategy is to raise state
capability by reinvigorating public institu-
tions. This means designing effective rules and
restraints, to check arbitrary state actions and
combat entrenched corruption. It means sub-
jecting state institutions to greater competition,
to increase their efficiency It means increasing
the performance of state institutions, improving
pay and incentives. And it means making the
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Box 1 The pathway to a more effective
state
A more capable state can be a more effective
state, but effectiveness and capability are not the
same thing. Capability, as applied to states, is the
ability to undertake and promote collective actions
efficientlysuch as law and order, public health,
and basic infrastructure; effectiveness is a result
of using that capability to meet society's demand
for those goods. A state may be capable but not
very effective if its capability is not used in society's
interest,
The path to a more effective state, although not
linear, is likely to be a two-stage process. First, the
state must focus what capability it has on those
tasks that it can and should undertake. As it does
this, it can then focus on building additional capa-
bility. As the figure illustrates, countries in Zone I
pursue a broad range of activities in an unfocused
manner despite little state capability, and their
efforts prove ineffective. But countries cannot
move to Zone Ill overnightbuilding capability
takes time, The pathway to greater effectiveness
leads, first, to focusing on fundamental tasks and
leveraging the state's limited capability through
partnerships with the business community and civil
society (Zone Il). Countries then can move gradu-
ally to Zone Ill by strengthening their capability over
time.
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state more responsive to people's needs, bringing
government closer to the people through
broader participation and decentralization.
Thus, the Report not only directs attention to
refocusing the state's role, but also shows how
countries might begin a process of rebuilding the
state's capability
Matching Role to Capability
Matching role to capability is not a simple message
of dismantling the state. In some areas much greater
focus is badly needed to improve effectiveness:
choosing what to do and what not to do is critical.
But this also involves choosing how to do things-
how to deliver basic ser-rices, provide infrastruc-
ture, regulate the economyand not just whether
to do them at all. The choices here are many and
must be tailored to the circumstances of each
country
The first job of states: getting the
fundamentals right
Five fundamental tasks lie at the core of every gov-
ernment's mission, without which sustainable,
shared, poverty-reducing development is
impossible:
Establishing a foundation of law
Maintaining a nondistortionary policy environ-
ment, including macroeconomic stability
Investing in basic social services and infrastruc-
ture
Protecting the vulnerable
Protecting the environment.
Although the importance of these fundamentals has
long been widely accepted, some new insights are
emerging as to the appropriate mix of market and
government activities in achieving them. Most
important, we now see that markets and govern-
ments are complementary: the state is essential for
putting in place the appropriate institutional foun-
dations for markets. And governmenls credibility-
the predictability of its rules and policies and the
consistency with which they are appliedcan be as
important for attracting private investment as the
content of those rules and policies.
A survey, specially commissioned for this Report, of
domestic entrepreneurs (formal and informal) in
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sixty-nine countries confirms what was already
known anecdotally: that many countries lack the
basic institutional foundations for market
Box 2 Credibility, investment, and growth
A survey of local entrepreneurs in sixty-nine countries
shows that many states are performing their core
functions poorly: they are failing to ensure law and
order, protect property, and apply rules and policies
predictably. Investors do not consider such states
credible, and growth and investment suffer as a
consequence.
Firms were asked to rank each of several indica-
tors on a scale from one (extreme problem) to six (no
problem), Averaging the answers, as the left panel
does for each world region, yields an overall indicator
Credibility Index
High-income OECD = 1.0
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development (Box 2). High levels of crime and per-
sonal violence and an unpredictable judiciary com-
bine to produce what this Report defines as the
of the reliability of the institutional framework (normal-
ized here to the high-income OECD countries) as per-
ceived by private entrepreneurswe call it credibility.
The other two panels show that, once differences in
income and education and policy distortions have
been controlled for, there is a strong correlation
between countries' credibility rating and their record of
growth and investment. The credibility ratings are
based on investors' perceptions. But it is these per-
ceptions that determine investment behavior.
Growth of GOP per capita (percent per year)
Level of credibility
Gross investment (percentage of GDP)
Level of credibility
Note: The credibility index (left panell is a summary indicator that combines the measures in Figure 2.3. Each bar in the two right
panela is the average for a group of countries. The graphs are based on regressions for the period 1 984-g3 of GOP growth (thirty-two
countries) and investment (thirty-three countries) on the index, controlling for income, education, and policy distortion. South and
Southeast Asia and Middle East and North Africa are each represented by only three economies. Source: World Bank staff
calculations using data from the private sector survey conducted for this Report and Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, background
papers.
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"lawlessness syndrome." Weak and arbitrary state
institutions often compound the problem with
unpredictable, inconsistent behavior. Far from
assisting the growth of markets, such actions squan-
der the state's credibility and hurt market develop-
ment.
To make development stable and sustainable, the
state has to keep its eye on the social fundamentals.
Lawlessness is often related to a sense of marginal-
ization: indeed, breaking the law can seem the only
way for the marginalized to get their voices heard.
Public policies can ensure that growth is shared and
that it contributes to reducing poverty and inequal-
ity, but only if governments put the social funda-
mentals high on their list of priorities.
Too often, policies and programs divert resources
and services from the people who need them most.
The political clout of the more affluent in society
sometimes leads governments to spend many times
more on rich and middle-class students in universi-
ties than on basic education for the majority and
scholarships for the less well off. In many regions
poverty and inequality are often biased against eth-
nic minorities or women, or disfavored geographic
areas. Marginalized from public discussion and
excluded from the broader economy and society,
such groups are fertile ground for violence and
instability, as many parts of the world are
increasingly learning.
Public policies and programs must aim not merely
to deliver growth but to ensure that the benefits of
market-led growth are shared, particularly through
investments in basic education and health. They
must also ensure that people are protected against
material and personal insecurity Where poverty
and economic marginalization stem from ethnic
and social differences, policies must be carefully
crafted to manage these differences, as Malaysia and
Mauritius have done.
Government regulation is not the only answer to
pollution. An expanding toolkit of innovative and
flexible incentives is now available to get polluters
to clean up their act. Although there is no substitute
for meaningful regulatory frameworks and informa-
tion about the environment, these new tools, which
rely on persuasion, social pressure, and market
forces to help push for improved environmental
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performance, can often succeed where regulation
cannot. Countries are using some of these tools,
with promising results, in four areas:
Harnessing the power of public opinion
Making regulation more flexible
Applying self-regulatory mechanisms
Choosing effective market-based instruments.
Going beyond the basics: the state need
not be the sole provider
There is a growing recognition that in many coun-
tries monopoly public providers of infrastructure,
social services, and other goods and services are
unlikely to do a good job. At the same time, tech-
nological and organizational innovations have cre-
ated new opportunities for competitive, private
providers in activities hitherto confined to the pub-
lic sector, To take advantage of these new opportu-
nitiesand better allocate scarce public
capabilitygovernments are beginning to separate
the financing of infrastructure and services from its
delivery, and to unbundle the competitive segments
of utility markets from the monopoly segments.
Reformers are also moving to separate programs of
social insurance, designed to address the problems
of health and employment insecurity for all, from
programs of social assistance, intended to help only
the poorest in society
Coping with household insecurity. It is now well
established that the state can help households cope
with certain risks to their economic security: it can
insure against destitution in old age through pen-
sions, against devastating illness through health
insurance, and against job loss through unemploy-
ment insurance. But the idea that the state alone
must carry this burden is changing. Even in many
industrial countries the welfare state is being re-
formed. Emerging economies from Brazil to China
will be unable to afford even pared-down versions
of the European system, especially with their
rapidly aging populations. Innovative solutions that
involve businesses, labor, households, and commu-
nity groups are needed to achieve greater security at
lower cost. This is especially important for those
developing countries not yet locked into costly
solutions.
Effective regulation. Well-designed regulatory sys-
tems can help societies influence market outcomes
for public ends. Regulation can help protect con-
sumers, workers, and the environment. lt can foster
competition and innovation while constraining the
abuse of monopoly power. Thanks to regulatory
reforms initiated in the early 1980s, Chile's telecom-
munications industiy has enjoyed sustained private
investment, increasing service quality and com-
petition, and declining prices. By contrast, until
some recent reform initiatives, dysfunctional regula-
tion led the Philippine telecommunications indus-
trylong privately ownedto underinvest. The
result was poor and often high-priced service, impos-
ing a high cost on citizens and other firms. Making
the best use of the new options emerging for private
provision of infrastructure and social services will
also rely, often, on a good regulatory framework.
Industrial policy. When markets are underdevel-
oped, the state can sometimes reduce coordination
problems and gaps in information and encourage
market development. Many of today oldest indus-
trial economies used various mechanisms to spur
the growth of markets in their early stages of devel-
opment. More recently, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, and other countries in East Asia used a vari-
ety of mechanisms for market enhancement, in
addition to securing the economic, social, and insti-
tutional fundamentals. Sometimes these interven-
tions were quite elaborate: the highly strategic use
of subsidies, for example. Other times they were
less intrusive, taking the form of export promotion
and special infrastructure incentives. But the ability
to choose wisely among these interventions and use
them effectively is critical; ill-considered trade,
credit, and industrial policies can and have cost
countries dearly Many developing countries pur-
sued ill-thought-out activist industrial policies, with
poor results. Countries that have pursued an
activist industrial policy successfully could not have
done so without strong institutional capability
Managing privatization. Carefully designed regu-
lations and other active government initiatives can
enhance the growth of markets. But in many coun-
tries this can take time, as private initiative is held
hostage to a legacy of antagonistic state-market rela-
tions. And poorly performing state enterprises are
often a big drain on the state finances. Privatization
provides an obvious solution. In general it is easier to
sell off state assets once a supportive environment for
private sector development is in place. Economies
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such as China, Korea, and Taiwan (China) have
therefore opted not to give top priority to privatiza-
tion, but to allow the private sector to develop
around the state sector. This option, however, may
not be available where the fiscal burden is very
high, and where the presence of poorly performing
state enterprises impedes much-needed overall
restructuring of the economy
Experience has shown that the way privatization is
managed is terribly important to the end result. The
key factors are transparency of process, winning the
acquiescence of employees, generating broad-based
ownership, and instituting the appropriate regula-
tory reform. Where privatization has been managed
carefully, it is already showing positive results: in
Chile, for example, and the Czech Republic. Its
importance in the strategy to foster markets may
vary, but for many developing countries seeking to
scale back an overextended state, privatization must
be kept on the front burner. A carefully managed
privatization process brings very positive economic
and fiscal benefits.
Knowing the state's limits
The key to predictable and consistent implementa-
tion of policy is a good fit between the state's insti-
tutional capabilities and its actions. In
well-developed states, administrative capability is
normally strong, and institutionalized checks and
balances restrain arbitrary action, even as they pro-
vide government organizations the flexibility to
pursue their mandates. By contrast, states with
weaker institutions may need to err on the side of
less flexibility and more restraint. This can be done
in two ways:
Through self-restricting rules, which precisely
specify the content of policy and lock it into
mechanisms that are costly to reverse. Regional
common-currency arrangements, such as the
CFA currency zone in francophone Africa or
quasi currency boards as in Argentina, are exam-
ples of such mechanisms in the field of monetary
policy "Take-or-pay" contracts with indepen-
dent power producers serve a similar function ïn
utilities regulation.
Through working in partnership with firms and
citizens. In industrial policy, for example, states
can foster private-to-private collaboration. In
financial regulation they can give bankers an
incentive to operate prudently And in
environmental regulation they can use the
spread of information to encourage "bottom-up"
citizen initiatives.
Countries in transition face a special challenge: not
only are roles changing as a result of the adoption of
market-based systems; so are capabilities. Some
transition countries retain inherent capabilities in
the form of qualified people and usable equipment,
but they are not organized to perform in their new
roles. Sometimes islands of excellence are found in
countries where overall effectiveness has suffered.
The task of improving effectiveness here is in some
ways easier and in some ways more difficult: easier
because capability does not start from a low base,
more difficult because rebuilding capability means
changing attitudes. Reform is not a matter of simply
assigning people new responsibilities.
Reinvigorating Sate Institutions
Acknowledging the state existing, possibly meager
capabilities does not mean accepting them for all
time. The second key task of state reform is to rein-
Figure 2 A range of mechanisms can enhance state capability
Rules and
restraints
For example:
Judicial independence
Watchdog bodies
Merit-based
recruitment
and
promotion
Decentralization
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vigorate the states institutional capability by
providing incentives for public officials to perform
better while keeping arbitrary action in check.
Countries struggle to build the institutions for an
effective public sector. One reason the task is so dif-
ficult is political. Strong interests may develop, for
example, to maintain an inequitable and inefficient
status quo, whereas those who lose out from this
arrangement may be unable to exert effective
pressure for change.
But the problem of continued ineffectiveness, or of
corruption, is not entirely political. Often politi-
cians and other public officials have strong incen-
tives and a sincere interest in improving public
sector performance. But managing a public bureau-
cracy is a complex business that does not lend itself
to clear, unambiguous solutions. In fact, building
institutions for an effective public sector requires
addressing a host of underlying behavioral factors
that distort incentives and ultimately lead to poor
outcomes. Three basic incentive mechanisms can
be used, in a variety of settings, to combat these
deeper problems and improve capability (Figure 2):
Voice and
partnership
For example:
Deliberation councils
Coproduction
Client
surveys
Competitive
pressures
For example:
Competitive
service delivery
Effective rules and restraints
Over the long term, building accountability gener-
ally calls for formal mechanisms of restraint,
anchored in core state institutions. Power can be
divided, whether among the judicial, legislative,
and executive branches of government or among
central, provincial, and local authorities. The
broader the separation of powers, the greater the
number of veto points that can check arbitrary state
action. But multiple veto points are a double-edged
sword: they can make it as hard to change the
harmful rules as the beneficial ones.
In many developing countries legislative and judi-
cial oversight of the executive is weak. The setting
of goals and the links to the policies needed to
achieve them are sometimes diffuse, legislatures
suffer from limited information and capability, and
judicial independence is compromised. An inde-
pendent judiciary is vital to ensure that the legisla-
tive and executive authorities remain fully
accountable under the law, and to interpret and
enforce the terms of a constitution. Writing laws is
the easy part; they need to be enforced if a country
is to enjoy the benefits of a credible rule of law
These institutions of restraint take time to establish
themselves, but international commitment mecha-
nisms such as international adjudication, or guar-
antees from international agencies, can serve as a
short-term substitute.
A major thrust of any effective strategy to reinvigo-
rate the public sector will be to reduce the oppor-
tunities for corruption by cutting back on
discretionary authority Policies that lower controls
on foreign trade, remove entry barriers for private
industry, and privatize state firms in a way that
ensures competitionall of these will fight corrup-
tion (Figure 3). Such reforms should not be half-
hearted: reforms that open opportunities for private
entry into closed sectors of the economy, but leave
that entry to the discretion of public officials rather
than establish open and competitive processes, also
create enormous scope for corruption. Formal
checks and balances can also help reduce official
corruption, but they are seldom enough. Reforming
the civil service, restraining political patronage, and
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Where corruption is deeply entrenched, more dra-
matic efforts will be needed to uproot it. These
efforts should be focused on better monitoring of
official actionboth by formal institutions and by
individual citizensand punishment of wrongdo-
ing in the courts. In Hong Kong (China, as of July
1, 1997), an independent commission against cor-
ruption is one successful example of such an
approach. Likewise, recent reforms in Uganda have
incorporated several elements of the anticorruption
strategy outlined here, with some encouraging
results. The same mechanisms could be applied
around the globe: corruption, despite claims to the
contrary, is not culture specific. Reducing it will
require a multipronged approach, which must
include the private sector and civil society more
broadly The briber has as much responsibility as
the bribed; effective penalties on domestic and
international business must be part of the solution.
Subjecting the state to more competition
Governments can improve their capability and
effectiveness by introducing much greater competi-
tion in a variety of areas: in hiring and promotion,
in policymaking, and in the way services are
delivered.
Boosting competition within the civil service.
Whether making policy, delivering services, or
administering contracts, a capable, motivated staff
is the lifeblood of an effective state. Civil servants
can be motivated to perform effectively through a
combination of mechanisms to encourage internal
competition:
A recruitment system based on merit, not
favoritism
A merit-based internal promotion system
Adequate compensation.
Starting in the nineteenth century, all of today
established industrial countries used these princi-
ples to build modern professional bureaucracies.
More recently these principles have been applied in
many countries in East Asia, which have trans-
formed weak, corrupt, patronage-based bureaucra-
cies into reasonably well functioning systems. But
Effective rules and restraints improving civil service pay have also been shown to
Greater competitive pressure reduce corruption by giving public officials more
Increased citizen voice and partnership. incentive to play by the rules.
Low Medium High Low Medium High
many developing countries do not even need to
look overseas or to history for role models: they
exist at home. Central banks, for example, often
continue to work effectively and retain their
Figure 3 Factors associated with corruption
Index of corruption Index of corruption
Merit-based recruitment index Ratio of civil service wages to
manufacturing wages
Note: Each index score is the average for a group of countries. See the Technical Note for details and definitions of the indexes. Higher
values of the corruption index mean more corruption, and similarly for the other variables. The top left panel is based on a simple correlation
tor thirty-nine industrial and developing countries during 1984-93 (for the policy distortion index) and 1996 (for the corruption index). The
top right panel is based on a regression using data from fifty-nine industrial and developing countries during 196. The bottom left panel is
based on a regression using data for thirty-five developing countries during 1 970-90. The bottom right panel is based on a simple
correlation for twenty industrial and developing countries in the late 1 980s to the early 1 ggos: wage data are means. Source: World Bank
staff calculations.
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competence even when all other institutions have
declined. These agencies work well for all the rea-
sons listed above. They are less subject to political
interference. They have limited but clear objectives.
Policy distortion index Predictability of judiciary index
Index of corruption Index of corruption
Low Medium High Low Medium High
12
10
8
6
4
2
o
2 3 4
They are given adequate resources and training.
And their staff are usually better paid than theïr
counterparts in other parts of government.
Cross-country evidence reveals that bureaucracies
with more competitive, merit-based recruitment
and promotion practices and better pay are more
capable. In several countries (Kenya, the
Philippines) political appointments run quite deep,
whereas countries such as Korea have benefited
from reliance on highly competitive recruitment
and a promotion system that explicitly rewards
merit. Ongoing reforms in the Philippines are
examining these issues in an effort to improve
bureaucratic capability By and large, countries in
which broader checks and balances are weak need
to rely more heavily on more transparent and com-
petitive systems. The experience of certain high-
performing East Asian economies also shows that
meritocracy and long-term career rewards help
build an esprit de corps, or a shared commitment to
collective goals. This reduces the transactions costs
of enforcing internal constraints and builds internal
partnerships and loyalty
In many countries civil servants' wages have eroded
as a result of expanding public employment at
lower skill levels and fiscal constraints on the total
wage bill (Figure 4). The result has been a signifi-
cant compression of the salary structure and highly
uncompetitive pay for senior officials, making it dif-
ficult to recruit and retain capable staff. Some
countries, such as Uganda, are undertaking far-
reaching reforms to reduce overstaffing dramati-
cally, increase average pay, and decompress the
salary structure. But in many countries these prob-
lems have yet to be addressed.
More competition in the provision of public
goods and services. In many developing countries
services are delivered badly or not at all. Politicians
often intervene in the day-to-day operations of pub-
lic agencies, and managers have limited flexibility
There is limited accountability for results. And in
many countries the public sector has assumed a
monopoly in delivery, eliminating pressures for bet-
ter performance.
Building an effective public sector in these circum-
stances will mean opening up core government
institutions, to improve incentives in areas that the
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Figure 4 Higher government employment
often means lower government wages
Average annual central government wages
as a multiple of GDP per capita
Government employment as a share
of population (percent)
Note: Data are for ninety-six industrial and developing countries
during various years in the early 1 990s. See the Technical Note.
Source: Schiavo-Campo, de Tommaso, and Mukherjee,
background paper.
public sector has long monopolized. Dozens of
countries through-out the Americas, Europe, and
Asia have capitalized on changes in technology and
introduced competition in telecommunications
and electric power generation. This has resulted in
lower unit costs and a rapid expansion of service.
Competition is also being enhanced by contracting
out services through competitive bids and auc-
tions. This is a significant trend in industrial coun-
tries (the United Kingdom, Victoria State in
Australia), but such mechanisms are also being
used to improve efficiency in developing countries
(for example, that of road maintenance in Brazil).
Faced with weak administrative capacity, some
countries (Bolivia, Uganda) are also contracting out
the delivery of social services to nongovernmental
organizations.
There is a growing trend to set up focused, perfor-
mance-based public agencies with more clarity of
purpose and greater managerial accountability for
outputs or outcomes. New Zealand provides the
most dramatic example among the high-income
countries. It broke up its conglomerate ministries
into focused business units, headed by chief execu-
tives on fixed-term, output-based contracts with the
authority to hire and fire and to bargain collectively
Singapore has long followed a broadly similar
approach with its performance-based statutory
boards. Other developing countries are following
suit, with Jamaica, for example, establishing execu-
tive agencies along the lines of the British model.
But countries with inadequate controls and weak
capacity need to proceed with caution. For these
countries, giving public managers more flexibility
will merely increase arbitrariness and corruption
with no commensurate improvement in perfor-
mance. And writing and enforcing contracts, partic-
ularly for complex outputs, require specialized
skills that are scarce in many developing countries.
These countries need first to strengthen rule-based
compliance and financial accountability (as
Argentina and Bolivia have done) within the public
sector, provide greater clarity of purpose and task,
and introduce performance measurement (as in
Colombia, Mexico, and Uganda). As output mea-
surement and ex post controls on inputs are
strengthened, agencies can be provided more flexi-
bility in exchange for their greater accountability for
results.
Bringing the state closer to people
Governments are more effective when they listen to
businesses and citizens and work in partnership
with them in deciding and implementing policy
Where governments lack mechanisms to listen,
they are not responsive to people's interests, espe-
cially those of minorities and the poor, who usually
strain to get their voices heard in the corridors of
power. And even the best-intentioned government
is unlikely to meet collective needs efficiently if it
does not know what many of those needs are.
Giving people a voice. Partnership involves bring-
ing the voice of the poor and of marginalized
groups into the very center of the policymaking
process. In many countries, voice is distributed as
unequally as income. Greater information and
transparency are vital for informed public debate
and for increasing popular trust and confidence in
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the statewhether in discussing expenditure prior-
ities, designing social assistance programs, or man-
aging forests and other resources. Client surveys (in
India, Nicaragua, and Tanzania) and citizen charters
(in Malaysia) are providing new options for making
voices heard.
The best-established mechanism for giving citizens
voice is the ballot box. In 1974 only thirty-nine
countriesone in every four worldwidewere
independent democracies. Today, 117 countries-
nearly two of every threeuse open elections to
choose their leaders. But periodic voting does not
always mean the state is more responsive. Other
mechanisms are needed to ensure that the concerns
of minorities and the poor are reflected in public
policies. Getting genuine intermediary organiza-
tions represented on polïcymaking councils is an
important first step in articulating citizen interests
in public policymaking. Even more effective in local
and provincial government, these organizations
have recently become very active in developing
countriesespecially where the state has per-
formed poorly and where such organizations are
not suppressed.
Broadening participation. Evidence is mounting
that government programs work better when they
seek the participation of potential users, and when
they tap the community's reservoir of social capital
rather than work against it. The benefits show up in
smoother implementation, greater sustainability,
and better feedback to government agencies.
Higher returns from water-borne sanitation systems
in Recife, Brazil; housing schemes for the poor in Port
Elizabeth, South Africa; forest management efforts in
Gujarat State, India; and health care in Khartoum,
Sudan, are all testament to the power of partner-
shipthe participation of local people. This is in con-
trast with top-down approaches, which often fail.
In successful countries policymaking has been
embedded in consultative processes, which provide
civil society, labor unions, and private firms oppor-
tunities for input and oversight. In East Asia public-
private deliberation councilssuch as Korea's
monthly export promotion meetings, Thailand
National Joint Public and Private Consultative
Committee, and the Malaysian Business Council-
have provided mechanisms for feedback, informa-
tion sharing, and coordination.
Devolving power, carefully. The typical develop-
ing country has a more centralized government
than the typical industrial country But with some
significant exceptions, the past thirty years have
seen a small shift in public spending power in
developing countries from the national to lower lev-
els. The industrial economies have seen an opposite
trend, with spending power moving to the center.
Neither of these observations, of course, takes into
account the decentralization implicit in recent mar-
ket reforms, which have clearly reduced the direct
power and resources of central government in a
broad range of countries.
Decentralization is bringing many benefits in
China, India, much of Latin America, and many
other parts of the world. It can improve the quality
of government and the representation of local busi-
ness and citizens' interests. And competition among
provinces, cities, and localities can spur the devel-
opment of more-effective policies and programs.
But there are three big pitfalls to watch out for:
Rising inequality. The gap between regions can
widenan issue of considerable concern in
China, Russia, and Brazil. Labor mobility pro-
vides a partial solution, but it is seldom easy,
especially in ethnically diverse countries where
migrants are not always welcome.
Macroeconomic instability. Governments can
lose control of macroeconomic policy if local
and regional fiscal indiscipline leads to frequent
bailouts from the center, as occurred in Brazil.
Risk of local capture. A serious danger is that of
local governments falling under the sway of spe-
cial interests, leading to misuse of resources and
of the coercive power of the state.
These dangers show, once again, how central gov-
ernment will always play a vital role in sustaining
development. The challenge is to find the right divi-
sion of labor between the center and the other tiers
of government.
Strategic options for reform
Building a more responsive state requires working
on mechanisms that increase openness and trans-
parency, increase incentives for participation in
public affairs, and where appropriate, lessen the
distance between government and the citizens and
communities it is intended to serve. This yields four
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broad imperatives for policymakers:
Where appropriate, ensure broad-based public
discussion of key policy directions and priori-
ties. At a minimum this includes making avail-
able information in the public interest and
establishing consultative mechanismssuch as
deliberation councils and citizen committees-
to gather the views and make known the prefer-
ences of affected groups.
Encourage, where feasible, the direct participa-
tion of users and other beneficiaries in the
design, implementation, and monitoring of local
public goods and services.
Where decentralization is considered desirable,
adopt a carefully staged and/or sectoral
approach in priority areas. Introduce strong
monitoring mechanisms and make sure sound
intergovernmental rules are in place to restrain
arbitrary action at the central and the local level.
At the local level, focus on mechanismsand
horizontal incentives in government's relations
with the rest of the communitythat build
accountability and competition.
Of course, a strategy of more openness arid greater
decentralization has its dangers. The more numer-
ous the opportunities for participation, the greater
the demands that will be made on the state. This
can increase the risk of capture by vocal interest
groups, or of gridlock. Bringing government closer
to some people must not result in taking it even fur-
ther away from others. Equally without clear-cut
rules to impose restraints on different tiers of gov-
ernment, and incentives to encourage local
accountability, the crisis of governance that afflicts
many centralized governments will simply be
passed down to lower levels. But there are some safe
ways to start the ball rolling, including the use of
communication and consensus building to render
reform intelligible to citizens and firms and enhance
its chances of success.
Beyond National Borders:
Facilitating Global Collective
Action
Globalization is a threat to weak or capriciously
governed states. But it also opens the way for
effective, disciplined states to foster development
and economic well-being, and it sharpens the need
for effective international cooperation in pursuit of
global collective action.
Embracing external competition
The state still defines the policies and rules for those
within its jurisdiction, but global events and inter-
national agreements are increasingly affecting its
choices. People are now more mobile, more edu-
cated, and better informed about conditions else-
where. And involvement in the global economy
tightens constraints on arbitrary state action,
reduces the state's ability to tax capital, and brings
much closer financial market scrutiny of monetary
and fiscal policies.
"Globalization" is not yet truly globalit has yet to
touch a large chunk of the world economy Roughly
half of the developing worlds people have been left
out of the much-discussed rise in the volume of
international trade and capital flows since the early
1980s. Governments' hesitance to open up to the
world economy is partly understandable. Joining
the global economy, like devolving power from the
center, carries risks as well as opportunities. For
example, it can make countries more vulnerable to
external price shocks or to large, destabilizing shifts
in capital flows. This makes the state's role all the
more critical, both in handling such shocks and in
helping people and firms grasp the opportunities of
the global marketplace. But the difficulties should
not be exaggerated, particularly when laid against
the risks of being left out of the globalization
process altogether.
The cost of not opening up will be a widening gap
in living standards between those countries that
have integrated and those that remain outside. For
lagging countries the route to higher incomes will
lie in pursuing sound domestic policies and build-
ing the capability of the state. Integration gives
powerful support to such policiesand increases
the benefits from thembut it cannot substitute for
them. In that sense, globalization begins at home.
But multilateral institutions such as the World
Trade Organization have an important role to play
in providing countries with the incentive to make
the leap.
Promoting global collective action
Global integration also gïves rise to demands for
states to cooperate to combat international threats
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such as terrorism and global warming. Economic,
cultural, and other differences between countries
can make such cooperation difficulteven, at
times, impossible. But stronger cooperation is
clearly needed for at least five major concerns that
transcend national borders:
Managing regional crises. The threat of nuclear
war between the superpowers has given way to
a mushrooming of smaller conflicts, entailing
costly problems of refugee relief and rehabilita-
tion. No solid international framework exists for
managing these conflicts or helping avoid them.
A more integrated assessment of how state poli-
cies (and international assistance) help manage
nascent conflict is needed in designing economic
and social policy
Promoting global economic stability. Concern
has been growing about the potentially destabi-
lizing effects of large and rapid flows of portfplio
capital, particularly when a crisis in one country
can spill over into other markets. A variety of
international mechanisms have been suggested
to guard against such problems, and the
International Monetary Fund has recently cre-
ated a new facility to help members cope with
sudden financial crises. But prudent and respon-
sive economic policies at home will be countries'
best protection. Growing international labor
mobility is also raising a host of issues requiring
international collective action.
Protecting the environment. Urgent global
environmental issues include climate change,
loss of biodiversity, and protection of interna-
tional waters. International collective action can
help through better coordination, greater public
awareness, more effective technological transfer,
and better national and local practices. Progress
has been slow, however, raising the worry that it
will take a major environmental catastrophe to
goad countries into concerted action.
Fostering basic research and the production
of knowledge. Now being revitalized to meet
renewed challenges in food production, the
Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research has shown how technol-
ogy can be developed and disseminated through
international collective action. Similar consulta-
tive mechanisms need to be developed to tackle
other pressing research problems in the domains
of environmental protection and health.
Making international development assistance
more effective. To become more effective, for-
eign aid needs to be tied more closely to the
policies of the recipient countries. A high prior-
ity for aid agencies is to systemati-cally channel
resources to poor countries with good policies
and a strong commitment to institutional
reinvigoration.
Removing Obstacles to State
Reform
The history of state reform in today's established
industrial countries offers hopeand gives pause-
to today developing countries. Until the last cen-
tury many of the problems that now appear to have
reduced the effectiveness of the state in the devel-
oping world were in plain evidence in Europe,
North America, and Japan. But the problems were
addressed, and modern states with professional sys-
tems emerged. This gives us hope. But it also gives
us pause, because institutional strengthening takes
time. The reforms of the Meiji restoration, which
launched Japan onto the path of development, took
almost twenty-five years to take root. A more capa-
ble state can be built, but the process will be slow
and will require immense political commitment. It
is urgent to act now.
Over the past fifteen years many governments have
responded to internal and external pressure by
launching far-reaching reforms to improve their
performance. Typically, changes in macroeconomic
policydealing with exchange rates, fiscal policy,
and trade policyhave come fastest. These reforms
have political implications but do not require the
overhaul of institutions. They can be undertaken
quickly, often through decree, by a small group of
competent technocrats. All it takes is the political
decision to make the change.
But other state reforms, dealing with regulation,
social services, finance, infrastructure, and public
works, cannot be accomplished so rapidly because
they involve changing institutional structures estab-
lished for different purposes, to fit different rules of
the game. This kind of institutional reform involves
wrenching changes in the way government agencies
think and act, and often a complete overhaul of
long-established systems of patronage and corrup-
tion. But such change is absolutely essential if the
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Figure 5 Countries with good economic
policies and stronger institutional
capability grow faster
Growth in GDP
per capita (percent
per year)
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Note: Each growth rate is the average for a group of countries.
Results are based on a regression using panel data from ninety-
four industrial and developing countries for the period 1964-93,
controlling for education, income, and other variables. See the
Technical Note for details. Source: Commander, Davoodi, and
Lee, background paper.
capability of the state is ever to improve. The two
togethergood policies and more capable state
institutions to implement themproduce much
faster economic development (Figure 5).
Comprehensive reform along these lines will take a
great deal of time and effort in many developing
countries, and the agenda varies considerably from
region to region (Box 3). Reform will also encounter
considerable political opposition. But reformers can
make a good start by strengthening central agencies
for strategic policy formulation, introducing more
transparency and competition, hiving off activities
and agencies with easily specified outputs, seeking
more feedback from users about the delivery of ser-
vices, and working with labor unions on programs
that will enable workers to seek security in change
rather than seek security against change.
When do reforms occur?
Deep distributional conflicts and constraints
embedded in state institutions are at the heart of the
explanation for so many countries' failure to reform.
But they are not immutable. Ultimately, change
comes when the incentives to throw out the old
policies and old institutional arrangements become
stronger than the incentives to keep them. An eco.-
nomic crisis or an external threat, or the arrival of a
new government with fewer vested interests in the
old system, may provide the impetus for reform.
But reform can be delayed if those in power stick
with outdated policies because it is in their (or their
allies') interest to do so. And the delay can some-
times be painfully long, as in Haiti under the
Duvaliers, or Zaire today
Neighbors, too, can be a powerful motivator for
change. There is a clear domino effect at work in the
wave of reform sweeping East Asia, Latin America,
and much of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. The threat of being left behind can goad
countries to improve the functioning of their
bureaucracies. But research has yet to explain why
some countries respond to crises and others do not.
Why, for example, does popular tolerance of infla-
tion seem to be much lower in Asia than in parts of
Latin America? And why can some countries endure
a long period of economic decline before respond-
ing, while others take action much sooner?
Often the analysis of winners and losers yields a
prediction of whenor at least whetherreforms
will be undertaken. Reforms have little appeal if the
winners cannot compensate the losers. Even when
the potential gains are enough to allow for compen-
sation, reform can be hard to achieve because the
gains are spread over many people, whereas the
losers, although smaller in number, are powerful
and articulate. A further problem is that the benefits
are often realized in the future, whereas the losses
are immediate. Yet sometimes conditions have dete-
riorated so far that the winners far outnumber the
losers. Then reform can produce immediate eco-
nomic and political gains.
How can reforms be sustained?
Reform-oriented political leaders and elites can
speed reform by making decisions that widen peo-
ple's options, articulate the benefits clearly, and
ensure that policies are more inclusive. In recent
years farsighted political leaders have transformed
the options for their people through decisive
reform. They were successful because they made
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the benefits of change clear to all, and built coali-
tions that gave greater voice to often-silent benefi-
ciaries. They also succeededand this is
crucialbecause they spelled out a longer-term
vision for their society, allowing people to see
beyond the immediate pain of adjustment. Effective
leaders give their people a sense of owning the
reformsa sense that reform is not something
imposed from without.
Reforming the state requires cooperation from all
groups in society Compensation of groups
adversely affected by reform (which may not always
be the poorest in society) can help secure their sup-
port. Although compensation may be costly in the
short run, it will pay off in the long run. Deep-
seated differences and mutual suspicions among
groups can also delay reform. There are no quick
fixes for removing age-old enmities, but social
pacts, such as Spain's Moncloa Pacts and Benin's
National Economic Conference, can help.
International agencies can encourage and help sus-
tain reform in four ways. First, they can provide
important technical advice on what to do and what
not to do. This assistance is often invaluable, espe-
cially for smaller states that lack the resources to
handle all the technical issues internally But it must
be complemented by local expertise, to adapt
reforms to local conditions and institutions. The
World Trade Organization plays a major role in
trade reform, the World Health Organization on
health issues, and the International Labour
Organisation on labor legislation and employment
policy Second, international agencies can provide a
wealth of cross-country experience on a wide range
of issues. Often staffed by people from all over the
world, they can bring in experts from different
backgrounds. Third, the financial assistance these
agencies provide can help countries endure the
early, païnful period of reform until the benefits
kick in. Fourth, they can provide a mechanism for
countries to make external commitments, making it
more difficult to backtrack on reforms. If the history
of development assistance teaches anything,
however, it is that external support can achieve lit-
tle where the domestic will to reform is lacking.
Box 3 The regional agenda
The key features and challenges of improving the
effectiveness of the state in the various developing
regions are summarized below. These are of neces-
sity broad generalizations, and each region includes
several countries whose experiences are very
different.
Many countries in Sub-Saha ran Africa are suffer-
¡ng from a crisis of statehooda crisis of capabil-
ity. An urgent priority is to rebuild state
effectiveness through an overhaul of public insti-
tutions, reassertion of the rule of law, and credible
checks on abuse of state power. Where the links
between the state, the private sector, and civil
society are fragile and underdeveloped, improving
the delivery of public and collective services will
require closer partnerships with the private sector
and civil society.
The capability of the state in most East Asian
countries cannot be considered a problem. But
states' ability to change in response to the new
challenges facing the region will play a critical role
in their continued economic success.
The main issúe in South Asia is overregulation,
both a cause and an effect of bloated public
employment and the surest route to corruption.
Regulatory simplification and public enterprise
reform, and the resulting contraction of the role of
the state, will be complex and politically difficult.
The job of reorienting the state toward the task of
'steering, not rowing" ¡s far from complete ¡n
Central and Eastern Europe. But most countries
have made progress and are on the way to
improving capability and accountability.
Low state capability in many countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States is a seri-
ous and mounting obstacle to further progress in
most areas of economic and social policy.
Reorientation of the state is still at an early stage,
and a host of severe problems have emerged
from a general lack of accountability and trans-
parency.
In Latin America, decentralization of power and of
spending, coupled with democratization, has dra-
matically transformed the local political landscape,
in what some have called a "quiet revolution." A
new model of government is emerging in the
region. But greater emphasis is also needed on re-
form of the legal system, the civil service, and
social policies.
In the Middle East and North Africa, unemployment
is by far the greatest economic and social problem
and makes government downsizing especially diffi-
cult. Because the political and social difficulties of
reform are considerable, although not insurmount-
able, a promising approach might be to begin
decentralizing selected services, and focus on
reforming state enterprises, while preparing the
ground for wider-ranging reforms.
Good Government is not a
Luxuryit is a Vital Necessity for
Development
The approach of the twenty-first century brings
great promise of change and reason for hope. In a
world of dizzying changes in markets, civil soci-
eties, and global forces, the state is under pressure
to become more effective, but it is not yet adapting
rapidly enough to keep pace. Not surprisingly, there
is no unique model for change, and reforms will
often come slowly because they involve a funda-
mental rethinking of the roles of institutions and
the interactions between citizens and government.
30
But the issues raised in this Report are now an inte-
gral part of the rethinking of the state in many parts
of the world and are on the agenda of the
international organizations that assist them.
People living with ineffective states have long suf-
fered the consequences in terms of postponed
growth and social development. But an even bigger
cost may now threaten states that postpone reforms:
political and social unrest and, in some cases, disin-
tegration, exacting a tremendous toll on stability,
productive capacity, and human life.
The enormous cost of state collapse has naturally
turned attention to prevention as a preferable and
potentially less costly course of actionbut there
are no shortcuts. Once the spiral into collapse has
occurred, there are no quick fixes.
Instances of state collapse are both extreme and
unique, but they are growing. As the Report elabo-
rates, no simple generalizations about their causes
or effects can be made, nor, for that matter, are there
any easy solutions to their reconstruction; each case
brings its own challenges for countries, their neigh-
bors, and the international system. The conse-
quences, however, are almost uniformly borne by
ordinary people, illustrating once again how funda-
mental an effective, responsive state is to the long-
term health and wealth of society
The quest for a more effective state even in the
established industrial countries suggests that the
returns to incremental improvements are high. This
is especially true in countries where the
effectiveness of the state is low. Over time, even the
smallest increases in the capability of the state have
been shown to make a vast difference to
the quality of people's lives, not least because
reforms tend to produce their own virtuous circle.
Small improvements in the state effectiveness lead
to higher standards of living, in turn paving the way
for more reforms and further development.
A tour of the world economies in 1997 would turn
up countless examples of these virtuous circles in
action. But it would provide equally plentiful evi-
dence of the reverse: countries and regions caught
in vicious cycles of poverty and underdevelopment
set in train by the chronic ineffectiveness of the
state. Such cycles can all too easily lead to social
violence, crime, corruption, and ïnstability, all of
which undermine the state's capacity to support
developmentor even to function at all. The cru-
cial challenge facing states is to take those steps,
both small and large, toward better government
that set economies on the upward path, using the
two-part framework suggested in this Report.
Reform of state institutions is long, difficult, and
politically sensitive. But if we now have a better
sense of the size of the reform challenge, we are also
much more aware of the costs of leaving things as
they are.
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